Classical Ontological Argument

Saint Anselm

 

Anselm (1033-1109) argues that we can conceive of God as "a being than which none greater can be conceived." Yet, if we conceive of such a being as existing only in the understanding, a greater being could be conceived, namely, one that also exists in reality. Anselm's strategy, then, is to move from the admission that we have the concept of "a being than which none greater can be conceived" to the conclusion that God cannot be conceived not to exist.

 

(From Proslogiiim, in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, ed. S. N. Deane. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962.)

 

 

Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.

 

And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which 1 speak-a being than which nothing greater can be conceived understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

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Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

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Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality. 

God cannot be conceived not to exist.-God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.-That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.

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And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

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So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. I), since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool?

 

How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived. A thing may be conceived in two ways: (1) when the word signifying it is conceived; (2) when the thing itself is understood As far as the word goes, God can be conceived not to exist; in reality he cannot.

 

But how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.

But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity, which the object is, is understood.

In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any, or with some foreign, signification. For, God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. And he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in concept can it be non-existent. Therefore, he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.

 

I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now so understand by thine illumination, that if I were unwilling to believe that thou dost exist, I should not be able to understand this to be true.

 

 

 

 

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OBJECTIONS TO THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

 

One of the first objections that was made against the ontological argument came from Gaunilo who argued that the argument can lead to absurd conclusions:

 

For example , they say that there is in the ocean somewhere an island which , because of the diffi culty ( or rather the impossibility ) of finding that which does not exist, some have called the `Lost Island: And the story goes that it is blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance , much more even than the Happy Isles, and having no owner or inhabitant, it is superior everywhere in abundance of riches to all those islands that men inhabit Now , if anyone should tell me that it is like this ; I shall easily understand what is said , since nothing is difficult about it But if he should then go on to say, as though it were a logical consequence of this :You cannot any more doubt that this Island that is ore excellent than, all_ other lands. exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt that is in your mind and since it is more excellent to exist not only in the mind alone but also in reality , therefore that it must needs be that it exists: For if it did not exist, any other land existing in reality would be more excellent than it , and so this Island, already thought by you to be more excellent than it, and so this island, already thought by you to be more excellent than others , will not be more excellent If , I say , someone wishes thus to persuade me that this island really exists beyond all doubt, I should either think that he was joking , or I should find it hard to decide which of us I ought to judge the bigger fool.

 

 

 

 

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THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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• The ontological argument was first put forward by St Anselm.

 

• Ontological comes from the word ontology, which means the 'nature of being'.

 

• The ontological argument is based upon an a priori form of reasoning. That is to say that it attempts to establish the existence of God by snaking logical inferences from concepts that are contained within particular definitions.

 

• Anselm argues that 'God is that beyond which no greater can be conceived'. This definition tells us that God cannot however simply exist in the understanding alone (cannot simply be a concept), because to exist in reality is greater than to exist in an understanding. So if God is truly 'that beyond which no greater can be conceived' then God exists both in the understanding and in reality.

 

• Basically, if we understand God as 'that beyond which no greater can be conceived'; then he must necessarily exist, because something is greater if it exists than if it does not. By virtue of the very definition of God we are compelled to admit that He exists, otherwise to deny the existence of God would be to contradict what God means. Thus once one understands what God actually means, his existence becomes undeniable.

 

• Descartes' argument has a similar logical structure.

 

• Descartes argues that by 'God we mean a supremely perfect being, and this definition allows us to conclude that he must exist.

 

• Descartes argues that 'existence is a certain perfection', and since God is a supremely perfect being, it therefore follows that God must exist. To deny God would be to land oneself into self-contradiction.

 

• Gaunilo raised an objection to Anselm's version of the argument by contending that the reasoning of the ontological argument could be used to establish the existence of almost anything- hence it leads to absurd consequences.

 

• Gaunilo tries to illustrate his argument by giving the example of an island. (Refer to Gaunilo's quote).

 

• One could however argue that Gaunilo's example does not constitute a comprehensive refutation because Islands are material entities, whereas God has a unique ontological status by being the absolute and ultimate being. God is not a being at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of beings, but The Being that has a unique ontological status.

 

• Kant argues that the ontological argument is unsuccessful because 'existence is not a predicate'; that is to say that it is  not an extra property or quality. So to argue that God is omnipotent and omniscient and then to add 'he exists' is not to tell us anything more about God. Kant is therefore contending that in order to prove the existence of God one cannot rely on definitions about predicates, for any definition of the predicate presupposes the existence of the subject, but since 'existence is not a predicate' the ontological argument fails to establish the actual existence of God.

 

• Charles Hartshorne agrees with Kant that existence per se in not a predicate, but tries to salvage credibility for the argument by drawing a distinction between two different types of existence: contingent and necessary existence. To exist contingently is to exist as a dependent being and therefore it is possible not to exist; to necessary exist is to have an independent existence so that it is impossible not to exist.
   

• Hartshorne argues that to exist necessarily is greater than to exist as a contingent being. If God existed contingently he would not be the best conceivable being, but God, as the greatest possible being, possess necessary existence. Therefore God's existence is either logically necessary or logically impossible. God's existence is not logically impossible, so it must therefore be logically necessary.
   

• The point concerns not only the status of necessary existence as a supposed great-making property, but the very conception of God itself.
   

• But even if one accepts the distinction between necessary and contingent existence to be relevant to the ontological argument, the mere fact that it only attempts to establish the logical necessity of the existence of God means that it has not established the existence of God as a factual necessity. So in other words whether he can be said to actually exist as a matter of fact remains unproven.
   

• The argument is logical but does not establish the truth of its conclusion.

• What is true pertains only to the definition and does not cross over into reality.

• One Cannot proceed from concepts into reality.
  
  
  
  
  
   

• THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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• •           The word `teleological' comes from the Greek word telos, which means `purpose' or `end'.

• •           The teleological argument makes reference to the actual nature of the universe by highlighting the fact that it exhibits design, purpose and appears to be governed by laws that ensure its continuance as an ordered system.

• •           There are essentially two versions of the argument: The Analogical Teleological argument and The Anthropic or Inductive Teleological argument.

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• The classical analogical version of the argument was put forward by William Paley (1743-1805). Paley presents us with the following scenario:

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• ... Suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possi66y answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it fwd lain therefore ever. ... But suppose I found a watch upon the ground and it should be inquired how the watch happened to 6e in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone?

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• Paley's answer is that the watch shows evidence of design and purpose-it is a teleological system. By means of an analogical deduction Paley argues that since the universe is analogous to the watch, it is also a teleological system. The universe must therefore be the result of purposive intelligence, in the same way that a watch is the result of human intelligence. In other words, like effects have like causes.

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• OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALOGICAL VERSION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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• Critique of analogy:

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• David Hume argues that human productions are simply not analogous to nature, and given this fact a deductive inference to a divine intelligence/designer is not justified:

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• If we see a house . . . we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect that we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause.

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• The conclusion is presumptuous because we have no experience of the universe being created.

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• Hume argues that we can and indeed have experience of humans constructing ships and watches and can thus infer that when we see a ship or a watch (the effect) some one must have made it, but we did not witness someone building another universe from which we can infer that our universe has a similar cause. Thus Hume states:

• And will any man tell me with serious countenance that an order y universe must arise from some thought and art like the human because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient surely, that we have seen ships and cities from human art and contrivance . . ..

• ... Can you pretend to show any similarity between the fabric of a house and the generation of a universe? Maw you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have Worlds ever been formed under your eye, and have you had the leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, fm the first appearance of order to its fimal consummation? If you have, then cite your experience and deliver your theory.

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• The premise that like effects prove like causes is self-defeating:

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• This is the same criticism he makes of the cosmological argument:

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• First, by this method of reasoning you renounce all claims to infinity in any of the attributes of the deity. For, as the cause ought only 6e proportional to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognisance, is not infinite what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the divine being?

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• Self-design or self-organisation cannot be a' priori ruled out in favour of a divine intelligence.

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• Hume is arguing that for all we know matter may contain within itself something that creates order- an order that is self-generated:

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• For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, fm an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement.

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• Kant's argument that design is a construct of the mind.

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• Kant argues that design in nature is not an external and independent reality in its own right; design in fact is a construct of the mind. We have a need to make nature intelligible to us, and to achieve intelligibility, we simply devise laws and impose them onto nature. So design in nature is not an actual external fact; it is something we have devised to make sense of nature. If there is no such thing as design as an external fact, then the whole foundation of the teleological argument is undermined

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• The Anthropic or Inductive Teleological argument
   

•  The Anthropic/Inductive argument is a recent development within the tradition of the teleological argument. It is called `inductive' because by observing a series of particular circumstances, it draws the general conclusion that the existence of life-permitting circumstances can be best explained by reference to an ultimate designer. It is also called `anthropic' because it focuses on the physical constants needed for conscious human life.

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  The argument states that a large number of basic physical constants were needed for conscious life to arise; yet each individual constant, let alone all of them together, are a priori extremely improbable.
   

• The very fact that we exist, which is a priori extremely unlikely, and are able to observe the universe, strongly suggests the existence of an ultimate and universal intelligence (God).
  
  The existence of an intelligent creator is considered to be the best explanation of an a priori unlikely universe.

• Basically the argument states that since the existence of conscious life is so improbable, the fact that there is conscious life means that there must be an intelligent designer
   

• Advocates of the Anthropic/Inductive teleological argument appeal to facts such as the following:

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• The inorganic contains a vast complex of seemingly unrelated conditions the physical-chemical composition of the universe, the expansion rate of the universe, the size of the electric charge of the electron, the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron, the distance of the earth from the sun, the composition of the atmosphere and the earth, the presence of water, oxygen, and carbon, the rotational speed of the earth-all of which are necessary for sustaining the life of those who observe the universe. Many of these conditions (for example, that the strong and weak nuclear forces have a specific value) have a very low, a priori probability, given what we know about the prior natural causes. However, looked at from the perspective of our contemporary situation, we see that such conditions are necessary for there to be intelligent human beings. We could not be what we are-living, knowing, valuing, aesthetic beings-without the universe having these specific conditions.

• For example, had "the Big Bang expanded at a different rate, life would not have evolved. A reduction by one part in a million millione at an initial stage would have led to re-collapse before temperatures could fall below ten thousand degrees. An early increase by one part in a million would have prevented the growth of galaxies, stars and planets."' Or if the gravitational force were slightly greater, all the stars would be blue giants whose life span is too short to allow the evolution of intelligent life. But if it were slightly less, the universe would be devoid of many elements essential to life. Further, "if the electric charge of the electron had been only slightly different, stars either would have been unable to burn hydrogen and helium, or else they would not have exploded, giving us the heavier chemical elements. Or again, the universe must be so big to be so old, and it must be so old to create the chemicals necessary for the evolution of life. In particular, the basic element of life-carbon-could be formed only after the universe had cooled down from the Big Bang. But the time required for the evolution of the only possible basis for spontaneous generation of life requires a universe so big. In short, the inorganic fits into the narrow window of life-making possibilities. Hence, what is a priori unlikely is necessary not only for what exists now, but for the very possibility of seeing its purposefulness.
   

• Life as we conceive it demands severe constraints on the initial conditions of the universe. Life and consciousness are not only the direct result of the initial conditions, but could only have resulted from a narrow range of initial conditions (i.e., the constants had to be precisely as they are). It is not that changes in the initial conditions would have changed the character of life, but rather that any significant change in the initial conditions would have ruled out the possibility of life evolving later ... the universe would have evolved as a lifeless, unconscious entity.  
   

• In sum, the inductive teleological argument asks not who made the amoeba or the elephant, but how one accounts for the entire system that, developing from the simple to the complex, from the nonliving to the living, portends conscious life. The more one reflects on the narrow window that makes sentient life possible, the more this question becomes very significant. Law-governed, life-anticipating order appears in a number of areas not directly linked, yet at the same time it is a priori unlikely. If teleology made sense only in one area, there would not be much of a case. But the fact that appealing to purposive ordering best explains this factor common to a number of important areas

• lends credence to the contention that any explanation of the universe must take into account the activity of a purposeful being.

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• COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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• Critique of analogy

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• Human productions are not perfectly analogous to nature in all respects in that the type of design witnessed in human productions is not exactly the same as the type of design observed in nature such as the human body. Yet this does not appear to challenge the basic thrust of the teleological argument; although we are clearly dealing with two different types of design, they are sufficiently analogous or similar to the extent that both do still exhibit design-albeit different types of design. One could in fact emphasise the dissimilarity, at a certain level, between the two types of design and argue that this actually strengthens the case for making an analogical deduction: nature is a far more complex form of design than human productions, and. if it is the case that comparatively less complex human productions are designed, then a designer is necessitated all the more with the greater level of complexity exhibited by nature. So even if one insisted on the different types of design, this dissimilarity could be interpreted in a way to further the case for the teleological argument.

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• The different type of design' does not mean that they are not sufficiently analogous to make a deduction towards an ultimate creator.

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• Even if the dissimilarity is emphasised it could be 'used to further strengthen the argument: what is true for the less complex is even more true for the more complex.

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• The conclusion is presumptuous because we have no experience of the universe being created.

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• It is not necessarily true that -the only reason why we acknowledge the need for a designer for a watch or a ship is because we have observed such objects being constructed. What Paley is drawing our attention to is not our experience of knowing that watchmakers make watches but that the observation of the watch as an ordered and interrelated system compels us to necessitate a designer. If any of us were to be presented with an object that exhibits complex design which we had never seen or even heard of before, would we not be rationally compelled to postulate a designer, not on the basis of experience, but on the basis of the observation that the object is a complex and ordered system? Imagine if that object was a space ship, the inside of which exhibited the kind of futuristic technological complexity seen on sci-fi movies. We obviously have no experience of this object whatsoever, but the mere fact that it exhibits complex design is strongly suggestive of the existence of some kind of designer-even if it turns out to be an alien! This argument is perhaps not conclusive in showing the necessity of a designer, but it is conclusive in proving the following point:    

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• There is no a priori reason why the cause of any object that exhibits design must necessarily be experienced in order to argue that the object necessitates a designer.

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• The premise that like effects prove like causes is self-defeating

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• The law of proportionality applies to the material objects within the universe-the relationship between material effects and material causes. The teleological argument is not explaining the relationship of design between material objects within the universe, but the totality of design in the universe as a whole. The law of causal proportionality does not apply to God as the ultimate designer because God is not a material cause but an efficient cause.

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• •           The law of causal proportionality does not apply to God because God is not a material cause but an efficient cause.

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• Kant's argument that design is a construct of the mind

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• To some extent our understanding of the `laws of nature' are constructs of the mind as is evidenced by the almost continuous refinements of how the universe is modelled and understood that are undertaken by different specialised fields within natural science. Yet it is extremely questionable whether all our understanding of natural laws is merely an intellectual construct. The reliability, explanatory power, predictiveability and consistency in. producing results (all of which are observable) indicates that there must a be a very close correspondence, if not an exact match in some cases, between our understanding of the way the -universe works and the reality of how the universe actually works. It would be pretty much impossible to send people to the moon if our understanding of the laws of physics were nothing, but constructs. There must be some core amount of independent laws on which we impose various models and layers of interpretation.

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• That fact that our understanding of the laws of the universe consistently yield reliable and- predictable- results is good reason: to believe that, at a fundamental level, design exists as an independent and objective reality.

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• Self-design or self-organisation cannot be a priori ruled out in favour of divine intelligence.

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• This is a common argument used by modern day Darwinians except that they use terms such as self-replication. The argument is that matter might be self-organising and therefore not require a divine designer. The argument does not deny the fact of design but the assertion that design must be arranged by an external being. There are number of problems with this argument, the first most obvious one is that the argument does not turn out to be an argument at all. It is a description or a statement of what one thinks could have happened and not an argument that demonstrates why we should believe that self-organisation actually explains how it did in fact happen.

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• Secondly, from the point of view of the anthropic teleological argument, the concept of self-organisation runs contrary to the a priori improbability of life permitting circumstances. Darwinians try to get around this by discussing the ongoing process of micro-evolution but such ingenious manoeuvres again fall into the trap of treating description to be synonymous with actual argument.

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• Furthermore, even from the point of view of Darwinian evolution, the a priori improbability of the original life permitting circumstances remain unexplained. What about the nature of human consciousness? How did self-consciousness supposedly evolve from a random, purposeless mass of inanimate matter? The most acute philosophical dilemma for the notion of self -organisation is that it is impossible to actually prove a priori. Any supposed evidence of self-organisation can never prove the principle of self-organisation because the interpretation of the evidence will presuppose, and therefore not prove, the principle of self-organisation. The only reason why any given event will be seen as evidence of self-organisation is because one is already committed to the belief in self-organisation; for why not interpret the same event as evidence of divine intelligence, particularly given the a priori improbability of the original life permitting circumstances?

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• Atheists often try to show the plausibility of self-organisation, i.e. the possibility of complex order evolving out of utterly random processes, by various hypothetical scenarios. For example, if a monkey was left alone with a computer for an infinite amount of time, it is possible that he could produce a piece of literature comparable to the works of Shakespeare, or that given enough chances a pack of cards dealt randomly could end up being perfectly ordered in the sequential order of numbers and suits. But all such scenarios actually prove the opposite of what they are intended to establish. Any example such as the above, demonstrate the necessity of some kind of design because in each case a situation is being designed to show that design is not necessary. Even though the actual examples could be criticised for their improbability, nevertheless, the atheist in constructing such examples is vindicating the theistic assertion that complex design is not the product of mindless matter. If self-organisation is truly possible then what atheists has to prove is that in the absence of a typewriter, and a monkey to push the keys, matter will suddenly join together to produce a monkey and a type writer! The same applies to the cards. What the atheists needs to show is that if the cards were left on a table, they would, without being dealt by anyone, suddenly jump in and out of each other so as to organise themselves into numbers and suits. Otherwise it seems to be a rather contradictory way of demonstrating self-organisation by designing a situation, without which the improbable situation could not even begin to be realised, to prove that design does not require any type of external design. Yet of course there is absolutely no way of proving even the possibility of self-organisation without developing scenarios that are based upon the opposite assumption: the necessity of an intelligent designer.

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   The concept of self-organisation is a description and not an argument that demonstrates a fact.

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•  Self-organisation can only remain a highly question presupposition because it is impossible to prove a priori.

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• The a priori improbability of the original life permitting circumstances strongly supports the view that the only reason for ruling out divine intelligence would be if self-organisation can be proven to be true -which is of course impossible.

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• The manner in which the belief in an ultimate designer is challenged paradoxically attests to the truth of the premises that underpin the argument for an ultimate designer.