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The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Advocated by William Lane Craig, who cites Imam Al Ghazali.

 

                                               Summery

We will go into detail about the Arguments for the proof of Existence of God.
Before we start we will summarize the main points into the next two and a half pages:

 

Two Arguments for the Existance of God:

The OntoLogical Argument, the principal of sufficient reasons and the Kalam- Cosmological  Argument.

 

 

Firstly to give a summary of session one.  Last week we looked at the role of Rationality in justifying beliefs.  We looked at two opposing arguments.  One argument which said that you have to rationally justify your beliefs. Otherwise you go against you very nature as a rational thinking being and also that you are forfeiting your moral obligation to assess beliefs.  So it important to analyze Arguments, beliefs, systems, philosophies, ideologies or doctrines by means of Rational Argument otherwise you commit yourself to an idea that has negative or detrimental consequences for humanity.  We examined the counter argument- Fideism that you do not need to rationally justify your beliefs and looked at the problems with that approach- uses rationality in explaining why and strengths the former argument rather then undermining it.

 

In this session we looked at two Arguments for the Existence of God.  The Ontological and the Kalam Cosmological.  The reason we study the Ontological Argument first is that some philosophers say that the argument that there is an unlimited being, which caused a limited finite Universe depends upon this (ontological) Argument.  So if the ontological argument is false any argument built upon it would be equally false.  So if the Ontological argument is insufficient in itself to establish the existence of God.  Then any argument based upon it or which presupposed it would be equally false.  So that if it is debatable or contentious then anything built upon would be debatable.

 

This Argument was put forward by Saint Anselm (1033-1109) and known as the classical Ontological argument.  Ontological comes from the word Ontology which means the nature of being.  This is Anselms thought in the form of a prayer of how to proof the existence of God.  The Argument focuses on the nature of Gods being.  That once you understand what God means you must conceive that God exists.  This establishes the logical necessity that God exists.  In that once you understand what God means by definition you must conclude that God is a reality.  Then we looked at one main critique by Kant that existence is not a predicate. For a predicate would presuppose the existence of the subject.  So taking the example of a soft drink can, predicates (describing an extra quality or property) would be to say it’s a cylinder shape, holds 330m, is green in colour-then to say it also exists- this does not add any extra property or quality because its presupposed to exist already.  We looked at Hartshornes elaboration on necessary and contingent existence and concluded the fact that it only attempts to establish the logical necessity of the existence of God means that it has not established the existence of God as an factual necessity.  The argument is logical but does not establish the truth of its conclusion.  The truth pertains only to the definition and does not cross over into reality.  We cannot proceed from concepts into reality.

 

 

 

Then we looked at the Kalam Cosmological argument and showed how the Kalam argument for the existence of God is actually established.  This is upon the principal of sufficient Reason.  What we are saying is that the first fundamental thing we must understand before we develop an explanation, before we try to look for an explanation as to whether there is a God or not.  We have to look at what lies behind our endeavor to establish the existence of God. That is if we think hard about it, how do we make sense of our reality.  The question of the existence of God is about the reality of our own experience.  What we mean by that is the reality of our own existence.  We go back to the principal of sufficient reason- Every thing that begins to exist has a cause for its existence (for it could well have not existed).  If you observe the Universe you find that it is made of contingent entities.  In that it could well have not existed it is not factually necessary in itself.  The Universe being made up of contingent entities is not in itself a necessary being.  It is made of things which are destructible, corruptible etc.  So for example if a jug of water is contingent and could well have not existed and everything in the Universe shares that attribute then it could have all not existed.  We therefore need to ask why it does exist.  The reason why we develop an explanation is that the nature of reality demands an explanation.  As it is not self-explanatory we therefore have to look to a reason beyond it.  The only way the Universe can be self-explanatory is if it is necessary but it is not necessary as it is made of contingent entities that could well have not existed.  The fact of contingency necessities an explanation, our basic question of why there is something rather then nothing, why does anything at all exist.

 

Whether the conclusion is God or something else is established once the argument gets going.  However the reason that it we kicked it off or put it into operation in the first place is not a question of God but to answer contingency.  This is important is that this argument is not about the attributes of God or the supposed personality of God because we have not reached that conclusion.  All we are saying is that this is contingent, how do we explain it?  If you say it does not require a contingent existence then you are contradicting the fact of contingent existence. For example that this table, glass, tape could well have not existed and therefore requires an explanation.  The fact that our reality is contingent is the fundamental fact and observed rule of the Universe.  Then we went on to say lets structure this argument by making two premises and one inferance (see handout on The Kalam Cosmolological Argument)

 

Then the most conceptual way of putting this forward is not Thomas Aquinas’s way which is to say that everything must come back to a first cause which leads to the problem of putting the first cause on the same level as the others.  So that if we can show Premise two- that the Universe began to exist i.e. had a beginning we can apply premise one to it and say that the Universe has a cause for its existence. We must note that the second premise that the Universe has a cause is not done by tracing the Universe back to a point of Origin which is the approach of Aquinas.  The best way is the way William Craig argues for the Kalam argument by saying that the Universe either began to exist or it did not.  Then the Kalam argument established Premise two by showing the impossibility of the opposite, that of a Universe having no origin.  As then the Universe must become an actual infinite.  So the Universe becomes an Actual Infinite of contingent entities if it has no Origin.  Then we showed the impossibility of having this which only leads to the other conclusion.  So the Kalam argument disproves the possibility of an actual infinite (i.e. beginningless) of contingent entities.  As it is impossible to have this then it must have a beginning. That a beginningless Universe has no first member.  Then in light of a beginningless infinite series, neither the present, nor tomorrow, nor any moment in the past could be reached.  We looked at examples of Hilberts Hotel and JP Moreland.  That on Premise one- the principal of sufficient reason, once you establish the need for an explanation- there is no escape from the question.

 

To add some notes form session 3 responding to criticisms, Mathematics deals with the abstract of an a potencial infinite whilst the Kalam argument argues that an actual infinite is impossible.  The Kalam argument establishes that God is factually necessary (because the Universe exists and must have an origin) not logically necessary.  So it works from the actual to the possible and not from a definition to a fact.  The Kalam argument argues  that there must be a cause and not the process of causation.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

 

Suppose you were strolling in the woods and, in addition to the sticks, stones, and other accustomed litter of the forest floor, you one day came upon some quite unaccustomed object, something not quite like what you had ever seen before and would never expect to find in such a place. Suppose, for example, that it is a large ball, about your own height, perfectly smooth and translucent. You would deem this puzzling and mysterious, certainly, but if one considers the matter, it is no more inherently mysterious that such a thing should 'exist than that anything else should exist. If you were quite accustomed to finding such objects of various sizes around you most of the time, but had never seen an ordinary rock, then upon finding a large rock in the woods one day you would be just as puzzled and mystified. This illustrates the fact that something that is mysterious ceases to seem so simply by its accustomed presence. It is strange indeed, for example, that a world such as ours should exist; yet few men are very often struck by this strangeness, but simply take it for granted.

 

Suppose, then, that you have found this translucent ball and are mystified by it. Now whatever else you might wonder about it, there is one thing you would hardly question; namely, that it did not appear there all by itself, that it owes its existence to something. You might not have the remotest idea whence and how it came to be there, but you would hardly doubt that there was an explanation. The idea that it might have come from nothing at all, that  it might exist without there being any explanation of its existence, is one that few people would consider worthy of entertaining.

 

This illustrates a metaphysical belief that seems to be almost a part of reason itself, even though few men ever think upon it; the belief, namely, that there is some explanation for the existence of anything whatever, some reason why it should exist rather than not. The sheer nonexistence of anything, which is not to be confused with the passing out of existence of something, never requires a reason; but existence does. That there should never have been any such ball in the forest does not require any explanation or reason, but that there should ever be such a ball does. If one were to look upon a barren plain and ask why there is not and never has been any large translucent ball there, the natural response would be to ask why there should be; but if one finds such a ball, and wonders why it is there, it is not quite so natural to ask why it should not be, as though existence should simply be taken for granted. That anything should not exist, then, and that, for instance, no such ball should exist in the forest, or that there should be no forest for it to occupy, or no continent containing a forest, or no earth, nor any world at all, do not seem to be things for which there needs to be any explanation or reason; but that such things should be, does seem to require a reason.

The principle involved here has been called the principle of sufficient reason. Actually, it is a very general principle, and is best expressed by saying that, in the case of any positive truth, there is some sufficient reason for it, something which, in this sense, makes it true-in short, that there is some sort of explanation, known or unknown for everything.

 

Now some truths depend on something else, and are accordingly called contingent, while others depend only upon themselves, that is, are true by their very natures and are accordingly called necessary. There is, for example, a reason why the stone on my window sill is warm; namely, that the sun is shining upon it. This happens to be true, but not by its very nature. Hence, it is contingent, and depends upon something other than itself. It is also true that all the points of a circle are equidistant from the center, but this truth depends upon nothing but itself. No matter what happens, nothing can make it false. Similarly, it is a truth, and a necessary one, that if the stone on my window sill is a body, as it is, then it has a form, since this fact depends upon nothing but itself for its confirmation. Untruths are also, of course, either contingent or necessary, it being contingently false, for example, that the stone on my window sill is cold, and necessarily false that it is both a body and formless, since this is by its very nature impossible.

 

The principle of sufficient reason can be illustrated in various ways, as we have done, and if one thinks about it, he is apt to find that he presupposes it in his thinking about reality, but it cannot be proved. It does not appear to be itself a necessary truth, and at the same time it would be most odd to say it is contingent. If one were to try proving it, he would sooner or later have to appeal to considerations that are less plausible than the principle itself. Indeed, it is hard to see how one could even make an argument for it, without already assuming it. For this reason, it might properly be called a presupposition of reason itself. One can deny that it is true, without embarrassment or fear of refutation, but one is then apt to find that what he is denying is not really what the principle asserts. We shall, then, treat it here as a datum-not something that is provably true, but as something which all men, whether they ever reflect upon it or not, seem more or less to presuppose.

 

 

 

 

THE EXISTENCE OF A WORLD

 

It happens to be true that something exists, that there is, for example, a world, and while no one ever seriously supposes that this might not be so, that there might exist nothing at all, there still seems to be nothing the least necessary in this, considering it just by itself. That no world should ever exist at all is perfectly comprehensible and seems to express not the slightest absurdity. Considering any particular item in the world it seems not at all necessary in itself that it should ever have existed, nor does it appear any more necessary that the totality of these things, or any totality of things, should ever exist.

 

From the principle of sufficient reason it follows, of course, that there must be a reason, not only for the existence of everything in the world but for the world itself, meaning by "the world" simply everything that ever does exist, except God, in case there is a god. This principle does not imply that there must be some purpose or goal for everything, or for the totality of all things; for explanations need not, and in fact seldom are, teleological or purposeful. All the principle requires is that there be some sort of reason for everything. And it would certainly be odd to maintain that everything in the world owes its existence to something, that nothing in the world is either purely accidental, or such that it just bestows its own being upon itself, and then to deny this of the world itself. One can indeed say that the world is in some sense a pure accident, that there simply is no reason at all why this or any world should exist, and one can equally say that the world exists by its very nature, or is an inherently necessary being. But  it is at least very odd and arbitrary to deny of this existing world the need for any sufficient reason, whether independent of itself or not, while presupposing that there is a reason for every other thing that ever exists.

 

Consider again the strange ball that we imagine has been found in the forest. Now we can hardly doubt that there must be an explanation for the existence of such a thing, though we may have no notion what that explanation is. It is not, moreover, the fact of its having been found in the forest rather than elsewhere that renders an explanation necessary. It matters not in the least where it happens to be, for our question is not how it happens to be there but how it happens to _exist at all. If we in our imagination annihilate the forest, leaving only this ball in an open field, our conviction that it is a contingent thing and owes its existence to something other than itself is not reduced in the least. If we now imagine the field to be annihilated, and in fact everything else as well to vanish into nothingness, leaving only this ball to constitute the entire physical universe, then we cannot for a moment suppose that its existence has thereby been explained, or the need of any explanation eliminated, or that its existence is suddenly rendered self-explanatory. If we now carry this thought one step further and suppose that no other reality ever has existed or ever will exist, that this ball forever constitutes the entire physical universe, then we must still insist on there being some reason independent of itself why it should exist rather than not. If there must be a reason for the existence of any particular thing, then the necessity of such a reason is not eliminated by the mere supposition that certain other things do not exist. And again, it matters not at all what the thing in question is, whether it be large and complex, such as the world we actually find ourselves in, or whether it be something small, simple and insignificant, such as a ball, a bacterium, or the merest grain of sand. We do not avoid the necessity of a reason for the existence of something merely by describing it in this way or that. And it would, in any event, seem quite plainly absurd to say that if the world were comprised entirely of a single ball about six feet in diameter, or of a single grain of sand, then it would be contingent and there would have to be some explanation other than itself why such a thing exists, but that, since the actual world is vastly more complex than this, there is no need for an explanation of its existence, independent of itself.

THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

 

Premise 1:      Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

 

Premise 2:      The universe began to exist, i.e. it had a beginning.

 

Premise 3:      Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.

 

Premise 1 is taken to be an intuitive truth; it is in effect, the principle of sufficient reason expressed in the form of a causal principle. Premise 2 is considered to be the most decisive premise to the whole argument. The kalam cosmological argument attempts to demonstrate the truth of premise 2 by showing the impossibility of believing in the opposite: an actual infinite of contingent entities. If an actual infinite cannot exist then it means that the universe cannot be considered to be an actual infinite of contingent entities. It must therefore have a beginning and by definition, a cause. The cause is taken to be God.

 

An actual infinite is a collection in which the number of members really is infinite. The collection is not growing towards infinity; it is infinite, it is complete.

 

William Craig argues that an actual infinite is impossible:

Let us imagine a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Suppose, furthermore, that all the rooms are full. When a new guest arrives asking for a room, the proprietor apologizes, "Sorry, all the rooms are full." But now let us imagine a hotel with an infinite number of rooms and suppose once more that all the rooms are full. There is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infinite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. "But of course!" says the proprietor, and he immediately shifts the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #3, the person in room #3 into room #4 and so on, out to infinity. As a result of these room changes, room #1 now becomes vacant and the new guest gratefully checks in. But remember, before he arrived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious, according to the mathematicians, there are now no more persons in the hotel than there were before: the number is just infinite. But how can this be? The proprietor just added the new guest's name to the register and gave him his keys-how can there not be one more person in the hotel than before? But the situation becomes even stranger. For suppose an infinity of new guests show up the desk, asking for a room. "Of course, of course!" says the proprietor, and he proceeds to shift the person in room #1 into room #2, the person in room #2 into room #4, the person in room #3 into room #6, and so on out to infinity, always putting each former occupant into the room number twice his own. As a result, all the odd numbered rooms become vacant, and the infinity of new guests is easily accommodated. And yet, before they came, all the rooms were full! And again, strangely enough, the number of guests in the hotel is the same after the infinity of new guests check in as before, even though there were as many new guests as old guests. In fact, the proprietor could repeat this process infinitely many times and yet there would never be one single nerson more in the hotel than before.

 

But Hilbert's Hotel is even stranger than the German mathematician gave it out to be. For suppose some of the guests start to check out. Suppose the guest in room #1 departs. Is there not now one less person in the hotel? Not according to the          but just ask the woman who makes the beds! Suppose the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, .. . check out. In this case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don't talk to that laundry woman! In fact, we could have every other guest check out of the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would never be any less people in the hotel. But suppose instead the persons in room number 4, 5, 6, . . . checked out. At a single stroke the hotel would be virtually emptied, the guest register reduced to three names, and the infinite converted to finitude. And yet it would remain true that the same number of guests checked out .this time as when the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . checked out. Can anyone sincerely believe that such a hotel could exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things.

 

The impossibility of traversing, (crossing) an actual infinite b successive addition.

 

This argument attempts to show that it is impossible to form an actual infinite by successive addition.

 

J P Moreland puts forward the following arguments:

 

Several reasons can be offered for the contention that an actual infinite cannot be traversed by successive addition. The first is an argument from the nature of causal sequences. Consider any event: for instance, a helicopter passing overhead. This event is caused by another event which preceded it in time-the pilot got in the vehicle. In order for any event to take place, the entire chain of its causal antecedents must have already occurred and be actual. Otherwise, a necessary precondition for the last member in the chain (the event under consideration) would not have occurred and the rest of the chain would not have occurred either (since its existence depends upon this necessary precondition).

 

Now the present moment has as its ultimate chain of causal antecedents the entire history of the cosmos. If any past event has not already been actualized, then the present could not have occurred. This means that the past is actual and contains a specifiable, determinate number of events. This chain of events must have had a first member. Without a first member, there would be no second, third, or nth member in the chain where the nth member is the present event. A causal sequence leading up to an event must have a first member and a determinate number of members in the sequence, since the entire sequence is already actual. But an infinite succession of past events would not have a determinate number of members nor would it have a first member. So if the past is actually infinite, the present moment could not have been caused; that is, it could not have come to be.

 

Consider a second argument. It is impossible to count to infinity. For if one counts forever and ever, he will still be, at every moment, in a place where he can always specify the number he is currently counting. Furthermore, he can always add one more member to what he has counted and thereby increase the series by one. A series formed by successive addition is a potential infinite. Such a series can increase forever without limit, but it will always be finite. This means that the past must have been finite. For the present moment is the last member of the series of past events formed by successive addition. And since one cannot reach infinity one at a time, then if the past was actually infinite, the present moment could not have been reached. For to come to the present moment, an actual infinite would have to have been crossed.

 

Third, suppose a person were to think backward through the events in the past. In reality, time and the events within it move in the other direction. But mentally he can reverse that movement and count backward farther and farther into the past. Now he will either come to a beginning or he will not. If he comes to a beginning, then the universe obviously had a beginning. But if he never could, even in principle, reach a first moment, then this means that it would be impossible to start with the present and run backward through all of the events in the history of the cosmos. Remember, if he did run through all of them, he would reach a first member of the series, and the finiteness of the past would be established. In order to avoid this conclusion, one must hold that, starting with the present, it is impossible to go back-ward through all of the events in history.

 

But since events really move in the other direction, this is equivalent to admitting that if there was no beginning, the past could have never been exhaustively traversed to reach the present. Counting to infinity through the series 1, 2, 3,. .. involves the same number of steps as does counting down from infinity to zero through the series . . ., -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0. In fact this second series may be even more difficult to traverse than the first. Apart from the fact that both series have the same number of members to be traversed, the second series cannot even get started. This is because it has no first member!

 

A beginningless universe has no first member. Before any event in the history of the cosmos, there has already transpired an actual infinite number of events. So no matter how far back one goes in one's mind, one is no closer to traversing the past than before he began counting-even if he counts back through an infinite number of events (which is impossible). In light of such a beginningless infinite series, neither the present, nor tomorrow, nor any. moment in the past could be reached....

 

It seems, then, that it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite. And since a beginningless series of past events would be an actual infinite, then such a series-given that we have reached the present moment-must be impossible. The universe had a beginning.

David Hume and the Cosmological argument

 

The kalam version of the cosmological argument, as is the case with all versions of the argument, regards the contingent entities in the universe to exist in a relation of causal dependence. Hume however argues that the cause and effect process does not need to be traced back to an ultimate cause:

 

In such a chain , too , or succession of objects , each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the whole , you say, wants a cause. I answer that the uniting of these parts into a whole , like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom , or several members into one body , is performed merely by an arbitrary act of mind , and has no influence on the nature of things.       

William Rose attempts to refute the criticism thus:

 

When the existence of each member of a collection is explained by reference to some other members of that very same collection then it does not follow that the collection itself has an explanation. For it is one thing for there to be an explanation of the existence of each dependent being and quite another thing for there to be an explanation of why there are dependent beings at all.

 

Do you think this is an adequate refutation?

Does Hume misunderstand the structure of the kalam cosmological argument?

How do you think a proponent of the kalam cosmological argument would respond to the criticism below?

 

If all contingent entities in the universe exist in a relation of causal dependence, and if God is the cause of the universe, then who caused God?

 

Hume and the principle of causal proportionality

 

Hume argues that every effect is proportional to the cause. Now if God is the cause of the universe, then given the principle of proportionality, God must be proportional to the effect (which is the universe). Yet if this is the case then God is on a par with the universe, sharing the same ontological plane as the physical universe. But as soon as one admits to this, God ceases to be an ultimate being, in other words God ceases to be God.

 

How do you think the Kalam cosmological argument would respond to this criticism?

 

 

 

  

 The Kalam cosmological argument:

criticisms and counter-arguments.

 

•           Criticism: If all contingent entities in the universe exist in a relation of causal dependence, and if God is the cause of the universe, then who caused God?

 

Counter-argument: The argument wrongly assumes that the kalam argument is based upon the causal principle that every effect is preceded by a cause; what the kalam argument is in fact based upon is the principle that everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. Since God did not begin to exist the question of who caused God becomes irrelevant.

 

•           Criticism: If every effect is proportional to the cause it means that the universe is proportional to God Yet if it is the case that God is on a par with the universe, sharing the same ontological plane, then God ceases to be an ultimate being; thus God ceases to be God     The principle of causal proportionality therefore undermines the belief in God

 

Counter-argument: The principle of causal proportionality is not what the kalam argument uses. The basic principle of sufficient reason that whatever begins to exist has a cause does not invoke the notion of proportionality but the intuitive belief that contingent entities do not arise out of nothing; that is to say that they do not suddenly

come into existence. The principle of proportionality applies with respect to the      r relationship of physical entities within the universe, and given the argument that an

actual infinite cannot exist, the cause for the origin of the universe must be beyond the universe itself, in which case the notion of proportionality cannot be applied to God as the atemporal cause of the origin of the universe.

.

•           Criticism: Infinite set theory within mathematics deals with the idea of infinity in a logically consistent way. This proves therefore that there is no contradiction entailed in believing in infinity; a fact that the kalam argument denies in order to establish the supposed beginning of the universe.

 

Counter-argument: Mathematics deals with the abstract idea of a potential infinite, the kalam argument however argues that an actual infinite is impossible and not that one cannot theorise about potential infinites. Besides, a potential infinite is always an actual finite.

 

•           Criticism: Kant argues that the cosmological argument presupposes the ontological argument because it conceives of the possibility of a necessary being on the basis of which an argument for His actual existence is made. Since the ontological argument is an unsuccessful attempt to prove the existence of God, the cosmological must be viewed in the same light.

 

Counter-argument:   This is a mistaken view of the kalam argument. The kalam argument does not depend upon first assuming that necessary existence is possible. Instead, the argument tries to show that necessary existence is actual, from which we can infer that it must be possible. The argument seeks to establish factual necessity and not logical necessity.

 

•           Criticism: Kant argues that all of our knowledge and understanding of causation is limited to our experience of the phenomenal world We cannot use the idea of causation to establish the existence of God, for this would mean inferring the existence of something beyond our experience. Hence the cosmological argument is taking our understanding of causation beyond its rightful limits.

 

Counter-argument: The ultimate cause is an extrapolation of our everyday experience of the phenomenal world that contingent entities do not come into existence uncaused. If this is held to be true of any contingent entity within the universe then the same must hold true for the origin of the whole universe itself. Tracing the cause of the origin of the universe, as a contingent entity, is only undertaken because our experience of the world compels us to explain the fact of its very existence. Just because the origin of the universe is being traced back to an unobservable cause does not necessarily mean that we are overstretching our understanding of causation, for it is the origin of the very universe that we experience to which we are seeking an explanation. The criticism seems to conflate the question of how the universe 'was caused with the  question of whether there is a cause to the universe. The kalam argument does not make the pretence to know how the universe was caused but only that it must have been caused as matter of factual necessity. Moreover, Kant does not deal with the question of why we should not argue for an ultimate cause for the universe given the fact that an actual infinite is impossible. If an actual infinite is impossible, then how else are we to understand the universe if we cannot argue that it was caused into existence? In the case of the origin of the universe, we do not need to experience the cause to know that a cause is required to bring the universe into existence.

Philosophy of Religion

                  Criticisms and Counter Arguments    

Session 4:  The final analysis of the kalam argument

Mackie’s critique of the Kalam argument and Craigs Counter Argument

 

 

In this session we looked at Professor Mackie’s critique on the Kalam argument by his attacking the two premises of the Kalam argument.  Firstly by saying that the principal of sufficient reason needs to be proved[1] which Craig counters by showing that to not to accept the premise to be an obvious self-evident truth raises serious difficulties in explaining why anything does not come into existence uncaused.  Supporting Craig, Professor Anscom says that then:

                                                (just as intelligible)

Something coming from nothing is      =      Something coming from something

So that someone walking down the street suddenly sees a lamppost coming out of pavement or for example an elephant suddenly coming into existence in a classroom.

Therefore the onus is not on the defender of the argument, rather of the critiqe to disprove it. 

 

Having failed to undermine the first premise, Mackie turns his attention to premise two.

He says that under this premise in the kalam  argument it says that the Universe has an origin because of the impossibility of an actual infinite.  That this is incoherent when at the same time you use this argument to say that there is an eternal being with no beginning or end i.e. an actual infinite.  So you are denying an actual infinite to establish an actual infinite.  What we are saying that it is impossible to have an actual infinite of contingent entities.  This is perfectly consistent with there being an Eternal being that must be the ultimate cause.  Mackie is confusing the concept of there being an External being with the comprehension of that being which are two separate things.  The Kalam argument is just saying that there must be a cause to account for the fact of contingency and not to give a comprehension of that being.  Indeed there is hadith that whatever you can imagine of God is not him that one cannot comprehend Allah (SWT) in his essence.

Also that in Mathematics you cannot have an actual infinite it will always be a potential infinite which is an actual finite.

 

Mackie then turns his attention to the inference, (therefore the Universe has a cause for its existence) and says that there is a prior (evidence without experience) no good reason why the Universe coming into existence of its own accord is unacceptable whereas the existence of God, with the power to create something out of nothing is acceptable.

Craig argues that God as an eternal and uncaused being is a “factually necessary” being.

The question is therefore whether something can come out of nothing, of its own accord, or whether something can come from nothing by the power or will of an ultimate cause.

 

Craig argues that you cannot escape the concept of an eternal.  If God is not eternal then the Universe becomes eternal, as in origin it is uncaused then.  Hence if it is possible that the Universe has no beginning and no end why would Mackie deny an Ultimate being  without beginning or end?  For to attribute this to the Universe you would have to say it has no origin which you can’t as you cannot have an actual infinite of contingent entities.

(and hence must have a beginning).  So if Mackie is willing to accept the Universe as being eternal why couldn’t he accept the possibility of an Ultimate being who is Eternal? 

 

It cannot therefore be the idea of a necessary being that is incoherent, rather any case of incoherence only arises when we consider to whom or what we should attribute this quality.  In other words, it is incoherent to believe that an ultimate being (God) is necessary and self-explanatory or that the Universe is necessary and self-explanatory?

 

In arguing that the Universe cannot be an actual infinite and hence must have a beginning.  Craig believes to have proven the point that the universe does not possess necessary existence.  Moreover, if the universe could well have not exisited then it cannot by definition be necessary because it has a contingent existence.

 

The question about the intelligibility of God as a necessary being clearly falls back on the validity of the entire Kalam argument.  So we are saying that theism or the kalam cosmological argument is more rationally plausible then atheism.  For an argument to be rationally plausible it has to be comprehensive and coherent (not contradict) and we can

See that attempts to refute the Kalam argument create more problems (which Makie’s critique falls into) then solutions.

 

Political Context

 

Professor Keith Ward (God, Chance and Necessity) makes a very good psychological point with regards to the Atheist.  He says that the Atheist is like a child who, not being able to deny the existence of his parents, wished they were not there so that he would have free reign.  Because the question of God brings up connotations against liberal values and freedom of the individual.  The atheist wishes that God rather did not exist.  Like Stuart Mill so that sovereignty would be for the human being in the world and that he would be master over himself.  So to support this political agenda, this would need some arguments to reject God.  As God would mean power, church control and authority over man and obedience to.  Also that the word God through Christianity with its doctrine of God incarnate has become associated with an anthromorphic image of God.

 

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason says that it is harder to for someone to believe that there is no God as the belief in God is intuitive.  As we would say the natural fitra of Man (Hadith).  That Allah (SWT) put this in our Ruh (Soul), the Ayat (Verse) of the Quran says that all of mankind was raised up and confirmed that indeed Allah is their Lord. 

 

The issue is that these very strong, undeniable arguments are glossed over in media soundbites when those that control the media just ignore arguments and deliberately push liberal secularism as a value judgement.  They want to make the good people of the West think that a belief in God iss that it is too demanding, that people are not used to the self-discipline in a society which is liberal/secular.

 

 

 

Recommended book:

 

God, Chance and Necessity by Professor Keith Ward

 

Next weeks topic:  Mackie’s full essay and Craig’s refutation of it.

The Teleological Argument which talks about from order to design-

We will see if we can integrate these arguments.

 

 

 

 

[1] See diagram on Whiteboard at the end of this summary. (TBA)

Video One:  The Examined Life: Does God Exist?

Video Two: Soul of Britain- Has Science swept Religion Aside?

 

The Qur'ans Argument for Gods Existence, a stand-alone article which explains

the Kalim Cosmological Argument. Click here to read from our esteemed brother; Hamza Tzortzis.

Summary

 

In this weeks session we looked at two videos, for those reading this on a website, we will try to get those videos embedded here, however you can still get something without them in the meantime.  Which continue in a similar way to last week’s two papers. (Again will try to get).  The first video like last weeks paper on God and Science applies the arguments for the existence of God. 

 

The second video, a BBC documentary recorded in early 1999 is similar to the second paper on peaceful co-existence giving another perspective on Religion and Science.

First in a short documentary, including the findings of a survey into religious attitudes followed by a group discussion looking at the relationship between Science and Religion in the Western Tradition.

 

At the end of both Videos, we can understand some points that we can draw from these videos and be aware of (Transcript to follow).  We can draw confidence in that many of their arguments against the existence of God, primarily in the first video are not strong at all and the bulk of their arguments are against traditional organized Christianity, which cannot be applied to Islam.

 

Video 2: Survey findings:

 

In the second video the survey findings commissioned by the BBC included:

26 % of people said that they believe in God.

44% said they believed in a spirit or life force.

48% said they believe in a Religion- fell by 10% in the last ten years.

31% believe we cease to exist when we die.

12% don’t know.

22% said that Science has undermined Religion.

30% said that they thought Science had harmed mankind

 

Transcript

 

  1. (Video 2)  “Religion begins where Science leaves off”  Rabbi Jonathan Sacks

 

Near the beginning he makes this comment.  We wouldn’t entirely agree with that because in a sense it’s fidistic.  That science is about gathering information and conducting experiments, thinking about things in a rational way- it takes you in this route.  But where it can’t take you is the answer to the metaphysical questions like; “What is the purpose of life”, “Morality- what is right and wrong”.  So here religion comes in, so that religion fills the gap which science leaves.  

 

This is not what we say about Islam.  As if you say that science is an intellectual enquiry based upon rational evidence, then the very root of our belief in Allah (SWT) is motivated by that rationale enquiry, a thinking contemplative process.  It is therefore wrong to say that religion comes in where science stops.  If we are saying that a belief in Allah (SWT) is rationally plausible then the foundation of religious beliefs is rationality not the other way around as he is suggesting.

 

What is his motive for saying this?  He knows that Judaism cannot be validated purely by a rationally way so you need to separate it by putting forward an argument that fortifies his claim.

 

2.   (Video 2)   “We have in inbuilt desire to seek ultimate meaning-for whatever reason”

Donha Zohar (Philosopher)

 

We have to ask why?  Because as created beings we are seeking that ultimate explanation for why else do we have that in-built desire?  “God spot” as she called it. If we are just material things then where do we get our moral sense or consense from if we just blindly evolved?  Some might say that this came from evolution itself for survival.

However moral can well override the survival instinct i.e. rescuing a child.

 

3. (Video 2)  “Some people select some aspects of organized religion and reject others”

Natasha (Humanist)

 

Said that some people say that they believe in Heaven but not Hell, in God but not the Devil.  Some people select some aspects of organized Christianity and throw away others.  However that has got nothing to do with the question that we are dealing with.

What she is trying to tear apart is traditional Christianity defined in a particular way, it does not address the question we are asking- Is there an Ultimate Creator or not?  A lot of their arguments are due to a disdain of Christianity.

 

So one of the reasons why West worked itself into a certain relationship between Religion and Science is because of its experience with Christianity, defined further into organized Christianity.  That helped to maintain the feudal structure, enforced certain irrational teachings such as the trinity.  So it was a rejection of that.

 

We can in some ways identify with a secular critique of Christianity- although we would not go all the way along with it.  You have to concede the ground to a certain point.  For example if somebody says that Christianity did not answer a particular point- it is true, according to the way they see religion to be.  Therefore our point is that when you criticize religion you cannot extrapolate and apply that to all beliefs that have a religious foundation.

 

Also that on a soci/political level although they are referring to a religion in the Christian spiritual sense not as an ideology, but what they are calling to is another ideology, which must similarly be subject to rational investigation.  Such an ideology as Capitalism may be convenient for some but very uncomfortable for others, such as the suppression of Muslims in Turkey.  There is no escape.  They would say that their ideology is without a supernatural explanation- but that comes back to the question of who caused this world?

 

 

  1. ( Video 2)  “Reason is as much a faith as Religious belief” Elaine Storkey (Christian Theologist, Academic)

 

She seems to be coming from a Fidiestic view then she is not correct, as we have shown on session one against Fidism. 

 

However if she is saying that there are some a priori things which are fundamental to our thought process which we must pre-suppose whether we believe in God or not, then she is correct.

 

Later she discusses that we need reason so seems to be suggesting a qualified version of Rationalism.  Where you have a rational way of thinking as long as it supports your beliefs but not to focus with too much of a critical edge as otherwise it will undermine them.

 

She did quote St. Anselm who got it in a nutshell, his quote was:

 

“I do not understand that I might believe, but I believe in that I may understand”

 

I don’t try to understand the basic, a prior principles that I might make in order to believe in them.  I believe in that I may understand- If  I don’t have a commitment to them in the first place- such as the principal of sufficient reason such, a prior principles then belief cannot come about.  So that I believe in that I may understand.  I must commit myself to certain facts of fundamental reason, before I can believe in anything, otherwise nothing makes sense.

 

 

5A.    (Video 2)   “Tolerance in Diversity”   Natasha

 

She commented on that in secular society we tolerate others, we don’t have to endorse what they are saying but can tolerate others.

 

The question is this:  If you do not have any absolute values because those values come from God- right or wrong is absolute.  That this specifies what you can tolerate and what you cannot.  If you then think the former then on what objective basis can you determine what you should tolerate and what you can’t?  Should you tolerate someone who does not believe in tolerance?  Should you tolerate the intolerable?  If you tolerate that which is intolerable then you are undermining the virtue of tolerance.  However if you don’t tolerate then you are not being tolerant!  The only way therefore that tolerance makes sense is if there is some absolute values behind it.

The common liberal idea is that the reason we must tolerate is because there is no absolute or definitive truth.  Then every ones opinions have to be respected and tolerated.  (This goes back to John Stuart Mills book on a strong argument for Liberalism on the topic of Political Philosophy, which will be covered later in that Module).

 

The only other angle is then to say that there is a definitive Truth, which defines what is an error or incorrect idea.  However the basis of Tolerance is based on what is right or wrong and this is the Islamic viewpoint.  We don’t tolerate because maybe we are right or maybe you are right.  Allah (SWT) has give you the right to believe in what you want as long as you don’t contradict the laws of the land (Shar’iah).  What is sacred is your right to believe.  The ayat says:  There is no compulsion in Religion.  The verse that follows that says that Allah (SWT) knows who is on the right path and who is on error.

So if you are trying to argue for Tolerance on the grounds that there is no Truth then you cannot say what to Tolerate and what not to Tolerate.  The question we can put to them is: “If you have no absolute values how do you decide what to Tolerate and what not to?”

 

Natasha said that many people find religion comfortable because it takes the need for reason away.  That the reason that Religion is appealing is because it is full of contradictions and that is its purpose.  Science, reason and rationality seem to be the enemy of Religion.  From our viewpoint we would say yes, if you are dealing with Christina theology but this has never been a problem with Islam.  The Quran challenges Mankind and Jinn to produce a verse like it (Kants test of falsification).  Many of the issues she highlights are not problems for Islam.

 

5B “Where Religion is taken seriously is place you would least like to live in &

 Places where they don’t take religion seriously are places where you would most like to live in”

 

If we look at the West from the 17th Century we see a detracting of Religious Institutions, the speeding up of scientific revolution and industrialization, development of a modern nation state.  One could think that as Religion has declined, we seem to have progressed in certain ways that we did not previously.  We would say this is true in the Western Christian sense.

 

This is in, organized Religion.  Islam has no priesthood or makes a distinction between a religious man and a secular man.  As we don’t make a distinction between the spiritual and the material.  In Islam there is no separation between the spiritual and the temporal.   Rather there is a mixing of the spiritual and material, as Islam is both a spiritual and political belief.  Whereas Christianity is a spiritual belief with a political allegiance to Capitalism.  We do have Ulema or Scholars however they are not like spiritual leaders in the sense of the Pope.  In the 1400 period of Islamic Rule there was many material and scientific advancements, that were adopted by the Western world.

 

Also that in some secular societies like for example China, it is extremely secular and extremely intolerant to opposing views.

Therefore the question that we can put is: What you define as a religious society is not what we would define to be an Islamic Society.

 

  1. “Science satisfies knowledge about the world, but Religion satisfies knowledge about the metaphysical.”  Therefore we get a religions divide.

Donah Zohar

 

Was talking about the hunger of knowledge and that the great thing about science is that it raises questions.  Science satisfies our hunger of knowledge of the world but it cannot satisfy the hunger for the metaphysical questions, which is satisfied by Religion.  Hence the religious divide.

 

However the holistic view of Islam does not fall into that trap.  Because part of your understanding of an ultimate being is the world that he has created.  We don’t say Islam satisfies our hunger for XYZ but leaves everything else aside.  The beauty of Islam is that it provides a framework in which other things function and work.  So we don’t have that divide.  What we need is a rational way not a religious or scientific way- as science studies how things are and how do they work by observation and experimentation all of which is a sub-set of ration.

 

The problem with materialistic science is that modern science it can tell you about nature, it can give you much knowledge about things, however it cannot tell you how to apply that knowledge so it does not have an ethical constraint, which can tell you how to do certain things such as cloning, GM foods and manipulation of genes.

 

7. The beauty of Islam is that not only does it encourage the pursuit of knowledge, that it also gives you an ethical framework that tells you what you can do in respect of applying that knowledge.  We integrate the two together and because they in the West have made a distinction between the spiritual and the material can never do that.

 

We would agree with the point that the reason we were created is to have an awareness of God.  In Islam to know Allah (SWT) and to worship him exclusively.  Not necessarily to make you happy.  By following the laws of Allah (SWT) will give mankind what is good in this world and what is good in the next.

 

Lastly, after an interesting point that in his class after some discussion with students, one pupil remarked that it seems that your religion (Islam) is based on logic and reason.

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